Will's points about Lebanese Hezbollah are real--particularly with respect to its rocket arsenal. LH is sitting atop--conservative numbers here--150,000+ rockets that are much more advanced than the crude "Qassam rockets" that Hamas uses (Iranian short-to-medium range missiles vs Hamas machine shop rockets). Anti-Missile Defense (AMD) sy…
Will's points about Lebanese Hezbollah are real--particularly with respect to its rocket arsenal. LH is sitting atop--conservative numbers here--150,000+ rockets that are much more advanced than the crude "Qassam rockets" that Hamas uses (Iranian short-to-medium range missiles vs Hamas machine shop rockets). Anti-Missile Defense (AMD) systems like Iron Dome--or even American-made Patriot-3 and AEGIS-based systems--are all vulnerable to sensor saturation because their tracking systems have a maximum number of incoming "tracks"--inbound missile trajectories--that they can fix and counter-fire against at any given point in time. If you fire a barrage of missiles/rockets that exceed that number then every single projectile that exceeds it will come through the counter-fire barrage and impact targets (ex: if a system can only maintain 16 tracks at a time and LH fires 20 rockets simultaneously, 4 of them get through and hit targets). One only needs to count the number of AMD batteries between Israel's northern border and Tel Aviv, estimate a multiplier based on how many open tracks each AMD battery could theoretically maintain, and then compare that number to the arsenal of missiles/rockets that LH has on hand to figure out that LH can overwhelm these systems via volume-of-fire and cause a whole lot of destruction in places like Tel Aviv should a war between Israel and Lebanon go hot. It's not a pretty picture, and that's before you consider what steps Iran would take in support of LH at a time when it is maximizing its munitions productions in support of Putin's war in Ukraine (Putin needs N Korean artillery shells more than it needs Iranian drones/missiles right now, giving Iran the space to shift munitions deliveries to LH if it wants to).
One has to think the IDF has some kind of offensive targeting plan. It's hard to imagine their only plan is to sit back and take it. This could get really ugly really fast. It's been my biggest concern all along.
Yes, the IDF will have a rolling intelligence collection program based off of where it believes LH's missile firing sites in Lebanon are on any given day. The problem here is that many of these sites will be mobile, and although Lebanon is a small enough country to be able to track this kind of thing pretty well, electronic intelligence (ELINT) will be of limited value because unlike anti-missile defense systems that run continuous radar that can be passively detected by ELINT collection platforms, missilie-*firing* sites do not need any kind of continuous emission into the electro-magnetic spectrum that would be vulnerable to detection and geographic fixing. That leaves imagery intelligence (IMINT) via satellite/drone footage, human intelligence (HUMINT) via spies, and comms intelligence (COMINT) via radio traffic intercepts as the primary methods of tracking the mobile missile launch sites. All three of those can be spoofed a lot more easily than ELINT can, and so the IDF/Mossad will plan and pre-strike these missile launch networks and their missile storage sites based on those other fragmented pieces of intel that won't be able to account for everything. And even then, they need to factor how easily Iran can get new batches of missiles into Lebanon via land corridors that they can't necessarily touch in places like Syria and Iraq without risking further regional conflicts if they make mistakes and kill citizens in those countries with targeted strikes there.
This is all before we talk about the other missile-firing sites in Houthi-controlled Yemen to their south that Iran also supplies via a mix of sea and land corridor. The north/south split of the LH/Houthi threats not only divides the burdens of missile defense coverage, it also divides the burdens of intelligence collection and the limited assets needed to cover that aspect of the war/defense planning as well. Even beyond Gaza, the IDF are in a tough situation trying to defend Israel from the missile barrage threat via two north/south axis' and are lucky to have the US and other nations covering a chunk of that air defense envelope in the Red Sea for them, though I wouldn't rely on that shared coverage indefinitely if I were them.
Bibi might want to consider a joint defense alliance with Sunni Arab states who also have military reasons to be displeased with Iran and it's proxies. It's hard to see any other solution for peace in the Middle East other than the enemy of my enemy is my friend.
That's always a perilous arrangement, particularly with authoritarian states. We made a similar play with the Taliban against the USSR during the '80's as I recall. If I were in Israel's shoes, I wouldn't trust the Saudis.
It's also worth noting that Iran has its own friends, not just in the region but internationally as well. The Syrian gov, Russia, Yemeni Houthis, LH just to name a few.
Because getting the Saudis involved risks making a smaller conflict into a larger one. It's the same reason we didn't ask Israel to be a part of the "coalition of the willing" that went into Iraq. Some "friends/allies" become more problematic than helpful on a case by case basis when it comes to stuff like this. You think Iran is going to sit back and watch Saudi Arabia get involved and do nothing about that?
OK, but is Saudi Arabia the only other Islamic (Sunni or Shia) that would be willing to join a peace-keeping force/rebuilding effort in Gaza? Notice I said "peace process," not "war effort." And, yes, I understand the concerns about starting a larger conflict, but under the right diplomatic circumstances (with UN participation?), Iran would be kept involved as well.
We have to keep options open and not be restricted by what has always been the case. Sure, we did not want Israel involved in any of our own mistaken war moves in the region.
I'm talking about a peace process, not belligerence.
Peace-keeping = occupation in the middle east. That means the region's largest Sunni power player occupying a zone where the Shia hold influence via proxies (Iran funding Hamas). That would be Iran's arch-nemesis militarily encroaching on its turf in the eyes of Tehran. Iran would also oppose that kind of precedent more generally of Saudi Arabia becoming a regional peace-keeping force. What would stop the Saudis from threatening Iran's Shia-dominant proxy governments in Syria or Iraq via "peace-keeping" for example? Iran doesn't want that Pandora's Box opening up and would fight it tooth and nail--including local Gazan insurgencies against a Saudi peacekeeper force.
The US was functionally a peace-keeping and nation-building force in the wake of Saddam's removal in Iraq and look how that went. Civil War, power vacuums, competing interests, an insurgency against the peacekeeping force *and* the new government. See what I mean? That kind of thing doesn't go cleanly out there. The same would happen with the Saudis acting in Gaza the same way the coalition acted in Iraq.
I respect your knowledge, experience and expertise in Middle East Affairs, Travis, and understand the complexity of a "pan-Arab" involvement and the likelihood of the results you describe.
You know first-hand what has happened when assurances of "peacekeeping" all too quickly turned into combat from those in opposition to any peacekeeping efforts.
My point is that we need to find a way to bring all parties to the table exactly so we can avoid the horror that ensued after our invasion into Iraq.
I'm not suggesting this approach could ever be completed without a realignment of Iranian interests in the region (and most of the Iranian surrogates' interests). We need the efforts of multiple powers from the region and beyond it, and as you suggested in an earlier post, the efforts are hampered all the more because of the devastation that Russia is creating in Ukraine.
But diplomatic efforts cannot stop merely because of the failures of the past. We need to keep trying, to make whatever connections are possible among all sides in the conflict.
Negotiations are at a standstill now and look what is happening. All sides are increasingly committed to a spiraling escalation of aggression.
"My point is that we need to find a way to bring all parties to the table exactly so we can avoid the horror that ensued after our invasion into Iraq."
Regional players like the Qataris and the UAE are already filling this role of diplomatic moderators with mixed success at best. This kind of thing is currently ongoing. It hasn't stopped.
The thing is, Palestinians as a collective peoples are entirely preoccupied with the wholesale destruction of Israeli Jews as a cultural/political goal, and there ain't no way of getting around that when it comes to finding a peaceful pathway forward. Even if the Palestinians got all of the 1967 lines back they would still want the wholesale destruction and/or removal of every single Jew from the Jordanian river to the Mediterranean Sea and there ain't a damned thing that the Qataris, Saudis, or the UAE can do to change their minds about that one. There is no peace until that changes, and the Saudis aren't going to get that done either just like the UAE and Qataris haven't been able to. "The people are the problem" here when it comes to the mindset and goals of Palestinians versus what peace would dictate be required.
Bill Maher said it best: "The Palestinians want to destroy all of Israel, but can't. Israel could kill every Palestinian, but won't." That's where things stand, and there will be many many more Palestinian kids dying as a result of the stance and actions that their parents take for the foreseeable future. It's going to be just another thing we're going to have to get used to living with like school shootings and climate change. There isn't likely to be any change in that dynamic in our lifetimes and we need to move from the "something needs to be done" mindset into the "things aren't ever going to change there" mindset. We're throwing up our hands for nothing at this point because there's not a whole lot we can actually *do* about this. Only the Palestinians can change the future for their children, and that starts with ending their desire for every Israeli Jew to be removed or killed.
I know, I know, I know, .... but the Gulf states are not serious players in this. They are as decadent and narcissistic as Americans have become. Look at the tourist ads for Dubai and you'll see where their interests lie. It's not in helping the Palestinians. But they do have an interest in helping Israel if their help would provide more transactional gains for their sheikdoms.
Can we find any links to unite (now a meaningless word) any of the parties locked in this path towards mutual destruction? Your answer is clear, and I thank you for it, even if I'm still holding out for a future (way beyond my demise) without these conflicts.
Otherwise, we (meaning all humankind) will kill one another one way or another, directly or indirectly, actively or passively.
Perhaps the "good night" is coming no matter how much we "rage, rage against the dying of the light."
"If a war starts, Hezbollah may use a low-level drone attack rather than the barrage of 1960s-era artillery rockets that Israel is expecting."
It will be a mix. That's a tactic we've seen proliferating out of Ukraine--a mix of projectiles varying by size and speed to throw off AMD systems. Sometimes it works, sometimes it doesn't (the volley the US/UK/Jordan/Israel shot down heading toward Israel was a mixed volley of drones and varying size/speed rockets for example). That said, the principles of sensor saturation/battery depletion remain the same: if you can fire off more projectiles than the AMD systems can track and/or counter-fire against, then enough projos get through to reek havok on their intended targets. LH/Iran could do swarms of cheaper drones to deplete the counter-battery silos of counter-fire rockets and *then* fire off the Iranian-made rockets after that so that the AMD batteries have nothing left to shoot the 2nd volley of rockets down with. The trick is to ensure that the 2nd volley goes into the air prior to the reload rate on those depleted AMD batteries. LH likely has been probing this factor to estimate the timing of their future mixed rocket/drone volleys in addition to studying the AMD counter-fire envelopes based on altitude and speed of incoming projectile.
It's more like a game of Texas Hold'em where nobody wants to turn the cards over. It's all bluffing and posturing until the cards get turned over and people find out who was bluffing and who wasn't, but by then it's too late and the metaphorical "pot"--the collective body count--is getting divided up and paid for amongst the players.
Hmmm. I think most Arab players in this war, or its expansion (Sunni or Shia), would prefer the chess analogy to any suggestion they resembled "Texas" gamesmanship.
I'm talking about Israel vs Hamas/Houthis/LH/Iran here, not the Arab regional players. The dirty little secret of the Near East is that most of the Arab states don't give a shit about what happens to the Palestinians apart from Jordan and to a certain extent Egypt because they both have to deal with the border issue and Palestinian refugees. Iran hates Israel, Jordan is sympathetic to the Palestinians, Egypt doesn't want border issues, everyone else mostly doesn't give a shit and doesn't want to touch that area with a 10ft pole.
Will's points about Lebanese Hezbollah are real--particularly with respect to its rocket arsenal. LH is sitting atop--conservative numbers here--150,000+ rockets that are much more advanced than the crude "Qassam rockets" that Hamas uses (Iranian short-to-medium range missiles vs Hamas machine shop rockets). Anti-Missile Defense (AMD) systems like Iron Dome--or even American-made Patriot-3 and AEGIS-based systems--are all vulnerable to sensor saturation because their tracking systems have a maximum number of incoming "tracks"--inbound missile trajectories--that they can fix and counter-fire against at any given point in time. If you fire a barrage of missiles/rockets that exceed that number then every single projectile that exceeds it will come through the counter-fire barrage and impact targets (ex: if a system can only maintain 16 tracks at a time and LH fires 20 rockets simultaneously, 4 of them get through and hit targets). One only needs to count the number of AMD batteries between Israel's northern border and Tel Aviv, estimate a multiplier based on how many open tracks each AMD battery could theoretically maintain, and then compare that number to the arsenal of missiles/rockets that LH has on hand to figure out that LH can overwhelm these systems via volume-of-fire and cause a whole lot of destruction in places like Tel Aviv should a war between Israel and Lebanon go hot. It's not a pretty picture, and that's before you consider what steps Iran would take in support of LH at a time when it is maximizing its munitions productions in support of Putin's war in Ukraine (Putin needs N Korean artillery shells more than it needs Iranian drones/missiles right now, giving Iran the space to shift munitions deliveries to LH if it wants to).
One has to think the IDF has some kind of offensive targeting plan. It's hard to imagine their only plan is to sit back and take it. This could get really ugly really fast. It's been my biggest concern all along.
Yes, the IDF will have a rolling intelligence collection program based off of where it believes LH's missile firing sites in Lebanon are on any given day. The problem here is that many of these sites will be mobile, and although Lebanon is a small enough country to be able to track this kind of thing pretty well, electronic intelligence (ELINT) will be of limited value because unlike anti-missile defense systems that run continuous radar that can be passively detected by ELINT collection platforms, missilie-*firing* sites do not need any kind of continuous emission into the electro-magnetic spectrum that would be vulnerable to detection and geographic fixing. That leaves imagery intelligence (IMINT) via satellite/drone footage, human intelligence (HUMINT) via spies, and comms intelligence (COMINT) via radio traffic intercepts as the primary methods of tracking the mobile missile launch sites. All three of those can be spoofed a lot more easily than ELINT can, and so the IDF/Mossad will plan and pre-strike these missile launch networks and their missile storage sites based on those other fragmented pieces of intel that won't be able to account for everything. And even then, they need to factor how easily Iran can get new batches of missiles into Lebanon via land corridors that they can't necessarily touch in places like Syria and Iraq without risking further regional conflicts if they make mistakes and kill citizens in those countries with targeted strikes there.
This is all before we talk about the other missile-firing sites in Houthi-controlled Yemen to their south that Iran also supplies via a mix of sea and land corridor. The north/south split of the LH/Houthi threats not only divides the burdens of missile defense coverage, it also divides the burdens of intelligence collection and the limited assets needed to cover that aspect of the war/defense planning as well. Even beyond Gaza, the IDF are in a tough situation trying to defend Israel from the missile barrage threat via two north/south axis' and are lucky to have the US and other nations covering a chunk of that air defense envelope in the Red Sea for them, though I wouldn't rely on that shared coverage indefinitely if I were them.
Bibi might want to consider a joint defense alliance with Sunni Arab states who also have military reasons to be displeased with Iran and it's proxies. It's hard to see any other solution for peace in the Middle East other than the enemy of my enemy is my friend.
That's always a perilous arrangement, particularly with authoritarian states. We made a similar play with the Taliban against the USSR during the '80's as I recall. If I were in Israel's shoes, I wouldn't trust the Saudis.
It's also worth noting that Iran has its own friends, not just in the region but internationally as well. The Syrian gov, Russia, Yemeni Houthis, LH just to name a few.
Exactly. Why haven't we heard more about the Arab states that were supposed to be included in a peace process between Hamas and Israel?
Because getting the Saudis involved risks making a smaller conflict into a larger one. It's the same reason we didn't ask Israel to be a part of the "coalition of the willing" that went into Iraq. Some "friends/allies" become more problematic than helpful on a case by case basis when it comes to stuff like this. You think Iran is going to sit back and watch Saudi Arabia get involved and do nothing about that?
OK, but is Saudi Arabia the only other Islamic (Sunni or Shia) that would be willing to join a peace-keeping force/rebuilding effort in Gaza? Notice I said "peace process," not "war effort." And, yes, I understand the concerns about starting a larger conflict, but under the right diplomatic circumstances (with UN participation?), Iran would be kept involved as well.
We have to keep options open and not be restricted by what has always been the case. Sure, we did not want Israel involved in any of our own mistaken war moves in the region.
I'm talking about a peace process, not belligerence.
Peace-keeping = occupation in the middle east. That means the region's largest Sunni power player occupying a zone where the Shia hold influence via proxies (Iran funding Hamas). That would be Iran's arch-nemesis militarily encroaching on its turf in the eyes of Tehran. Iran would also oppose that kind of precedent more generally of Saudi Arabia becoming a regional peace-keeping force. What would stop the Saudis from threatening Iran's Shia-dominant proxy governments in Syria or Iraq via "peace-keeping" for example? Iran doesn't want that Pandora's Box opening up and would fight it tooth and nail--including local Gazan insurgencies against a Saudi peacekeeper force.
The US was functionally a peace-keeping and nation-building force in the wake of Saddam's removal in Iraq and look how that went. Civil War, power vacuums, competing interests, an insurgency against the peacekeeping force *and* the new government. See what I mean? That kind of thing doesn't go cleanly out there. The same would happen with the Saudis acting in Gaza the same way the coalition acted in Iraq.
I respect your knowledge, experience and expertise in Middle East Affairs, Travis, and understand the complexity of a "pan-Arab" involvement and the likelihood of the results you describe.
You know first-hand what has happened when assurances of "peacekeeping" all too quickly turned into combat from those in opposition to any peacekeeping efforts.
My point is that we need to find a way to bring all parties to the table exactly so we can avoid the horror that ensued after our invasion into Iraq.
I'm not suggesting this approach could ever be completed without a realignment of Iranian interests in the region (and most of the Iranian surrogates' interests). We need the efforts of multiple powers from the region and beyond it, and as you suggested in an earlier post, the efforts are hampered all the more because of the devastation that Russia is creating in Ukraine.
But diplomatic efforts cannot stop merely because of the failures of the past. We need to keep trying, to make whatever connections are possible among all sides in the conflict.
Negotiations are at a standstill now and look what is happening. All sides are increasingly committed to a spiraling escalation of aggression.
"My point is that we need to find a way to bring all parties to the table exactly so we can avoid the horror that ensued after our invasion into Iraq."
Regional players like the Qataris and the UAE are already filling this role of diplomatic moderators with mixed success at best. This kind of thing is currently ongoing. It hasn't stopped.
The thing is, Palestinians as a collective peoples are entirely preoccupied with the wholesale destruction of Israeli Jews as a cultural/political goal, and there ain't no way of getting around that when it comes to finding a peaceful pathway forward. Even if the Palestinians got all of the 1967 lines back they would still want the wholesale destruction and/or removal of every single Jew from the Jordanian river to the Mediterranean Sea and there ain't a damned thing that the Qataris, Saudis, or the UAE can do to change their minds about that one. There is no peace until that changes, and the Saudis aren't going to get that done either just like the UAE and Qataris haven't been able to. "The people are the problem" here when it comes to the mindset and goals of Palestinians versus what peace would dictate be required.
Bill Maher said it best: "The Palestinians want to destroy all of Israel, but can't. Israel could kill every Palestinian, but won't." That's where things stand, and there will be many many more Palestinian kids dying as a result of the stance and actions that their parents take for the foreseeable future. It's going to be just another thing we're going to have to get used to living with like school shootings and climate change. There isn't likely to be any change in that dynamic in our lifetimes and we need to move from the "something needs to be done" mindset into the "things aren't ever going to change there" mindset. We're throwing up our hands for nothing at this point because there's not a whole lot we can actually *do* about this. Only the Palestinians can change the future for their children, and that starts with ending their desire for every Israeli Jew to be removed or killed.
I know, I know, I know, .... but the Gulf states are not serious players in this. They are as decadent and narcissistic as Americans have become. Look at the tourist ads for Dubai and you'll see where their interests lie. It's not in helping the Palestinians. But they do have an interest in helping Israel if their help would provide more transactional gains for their sheikdoms.
Can we find any links to unite (now a meaningless word) any of the parties locked in this path towards mutual destruction? Your answer is clear, and I thank you for it, even if I'm still holding out for a future (way beyond my demise) without these conflicts.
Otherwise, we (meaning all humankind) will kill one another one way or another, directly or indirectly, actively or passively.
Perhaps the "good night" is coming no matter how much we "rage, rage against the dying of the light."
"If a war starts, Hezbollah may use a low-level drone attack rather than the barrage of 1960s-era artillery rockets that Israel is expecting."
It will be a mix. That's a tactic we've seen proliferating out of Ukraine--a mix of projectiles varying by size and speed to throw off AMD systems. Sometimes it works, sometimes it doesn't (the volley the US/UK/Jordan/Israel shot down heading toward Israel was a mixed volley of drones and varying size/speed rockets for example). That said, the principles of sensor saturation/battery depletion remain the same: if you can fire off more projectiles than the AMD systems can track and/or counter-fire against, then enough projos get through to reek havok on their intended targets. LH/Iran could do swarms of cheaper drones to deplete the counter-battery silos of counter-fire rockets and *then* fire off the Iranian-made rockets after that so that the AMD batteries have nothing left to shoot the 2nd volley of rockets down with. The trick is to ensure that the 2nd volley goes into the air prior to the reload rate on those depleted AMD batteries. LH likely has been probing this factor to estimate the timing of their future mixed rocket/drone volleys in addition to studying the AMD counter-fire envelopes based on altitude and speed of incoming projectile.
Three-dimensional chess with exploding pieces.
It's more like a game of Texas Hold'em where nobody wants to turn the cards over. It's all bluffing and posturing until the cards get turned over and people find out who was bluffing and who wasn't, but by then it's too late and the metaphorical "pot"--the collective body count--is getting divided up and paid for amongst the players.
Hmmm. I think most Arab players in this war, or its expansion (Sunni or Shia), would prefer the chess analogy to any suggestion they resembled "Texas" gamesmanship.
The diplomacy is in the implications.
I'm talking about Israel vs Hamas/Houthis/LH/Iran here, not the Arab regional players. The dirty little secret of the Near East is that most of the Arab states don't give a shit about what happens to the Palestinians apart from Jordan and to a certain extent Egypt because they both have to deal with the border issue and Palestinian refugees. Iran hates Israel, Jordan is sympathetic to the Palestinians, Egypt doesn't want border issues, everyone else mostly doesn't give a shit and doesn't want to touch that area with a 10ft pole.