Five Ways American Political Dysfunction Is Harming National Security
It’s not just frustrating, it’s dangerous.
IT IS NO SECRET THAT American political dysfunction is becoming a weakness abroad and even a threat to our national security. But because the dysfunction has, by various metrics, grown steadily worse for decades, it’s worth looking beyond the current gridlock and the upcoming election to think about how well our nation will respond to security crises in a few years. The outlook is bleak. Here are five ways our political disorder imperils our long-term national security.
1. Making the world more dangerous.
The best weapon available to democracies in the era of great power competition against autocratic adversaries is for democracies to perform better—to create more prosperous and dynamic societies, and for the whole world to see it. Setting the example is a big part of how the West won the Cold War: by being—and being seen as—a happier, healthier, and more stable society than the USSR. This idea is not lost on President Biden, who recently told a Summit for Democracy meeting that “our democracy can still do big things and deliver important progress for working Americans,” specifying lower healthcare costs and infrastructure investments.
But America is seemingly losing the larger argument and the world is taking note. Autocracy is on the offensive, with a modern version of domino theory being debated while countries in Southeast Asia, Africa, and Latin America realign themselves in the emerging multipolar world. In the Cold War, the West, and especially the United States, represented a superior way of life for people trapped in tyrannies from Hanoi to Havana, Bucharest to Beijing. Today, when only 28 percent of Americans are satisfied with democracy, why would anyone look to the United States as a model?
Vulnerable societies living with less-than-stable governments are tempted by the allure of autocracy’s decisiveness, as seen in the spike of coups throughout Africa and democratic backsliding in Latin America and even in the world’s largest democracy. Autocracies tend to stick together, though not quite as tightly as democracies do. If America makes democracy look unappealing, we are likely to see democratic backsliding among some of our allies and partners, as we have already seen in Hungary and Turkey. And having fewer allies and partners will make long-term security threats like China and Russia that much harder to confront.
2. Making national defense objectives less clear and resolute.
War is a political instrument, and major decisions about when and how to wage war belong to elected officials. Yet 86 percent of Americans agree that “Republicans and Democrats are more focused on fighting each other than on solving problems,” which doesn’t bode well for how they evaluate their leaders’ ability to respond to international crises. The recent foreign aid bills for Ukraine, Israel, and Taiwan passed with overwhelming bipartisan support, but required months of negotiation, indicating just how little trust there is between parties even on areas of agreement.
When partisan politics incentivizes one side to disagree with the other for the sake of preventing a political victory, then the nation risks setting the wrong national defense objectives, and it hamstrings its ability to succeed when it sets the right ones. Michael O’Hanlon, a foreign policy analyst at the Brookings Institution and member of the Pentagon’s Defense Policy Board, suggested to the Wall Street Journal that anything resembling a foreign policy could be anathema to those on the other side of the aisle, especially as we get into an election year. The dynamic affects both major parties. More than half a year since the October 7 attacks in Israel, and more than two years since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, there is little progress in developing a coherent strategy for any of the emergent security issues facing the nation today—never mind long-term challenges like nuclear proliferation, health security, election interference, and energy and environmental security.
America’s credibility as a reliable partner and a dogged adversary is eroding. The problem isn’t debate—these problems are complex, and the competition of ideas about how to address them should be rigorous. The problem is that there are no incentives to resolve arguments—not through persuasion, not through compromise, and not through outright majoritarianism. All the incentives are just to keep arguing, which prevents the government from doing the things it needs to do to protect the Constitution and the country.
3. Impacting long-term recruiting, retention, and professionalism.
The United States Armed Forces are experiencing a recruitment and retention crisis. Many of the causes of this problem are short-term or amenable to solutions with policy changes, such as higher pay, less-stringent medical or education standards, and parental leave. However, one problem that the Defense Department will never be able to spend or beg its way out of is the fact that young Americans have a plummeting propensity to serve. In the mid-1980s, 18 percent of young Americans said they would “definitely” or “probably” serve in the military “in the next few years.” That number has fallen by half in the post-9/11 era. There are many social, cultural, and economic factors driving this decline, but in 2020, the National Commission on Military, National, and Public Service recognized that “fostering a culture of military service is ultimately ‘tied to the strength of commitment one feels to the Nation and its military institutions.’”
The Defense Department tracks the top reasons young people offer for their decisions to serve or not to serve, ranging from pay and the opportunity for adventure to the possibility of physical or psychological injury or the lengths of a military commitment. But one factor seems conspicuously absent: patriotism. In making the decision to sign up, new recruits indicate that their service is aligned with their morals and goals, and that they think military service is a good thing to do.
Yet rising generations are losing confidence in the country and even in democracy itself. They might not tell pollsters—especially from the Defense Department—that they think the country isn’t worth fighting for and that the military does more harm than good for society, but the prospective costs of possible injury, death, or deployment overseas loom larger when disconnected from honor, achievement, and the opportunity to do good.
The issue isn’t just one of numbers—there’s a qualitative aspect, too. Because the things that motivate those individuals who do join may be different from the things that motivated past generations, future service members may have different standards of professionalism. Put another way, the answer to the question, “What are we fighting for?” translates into every service member’s commitment to become the best at what they do, and eventually to have the will to fight in the face of danger, should that time ever come.
4. Undermining battlefield superiority.
The Defense Department and much of the rest of the interdepartmental security apparatus depend on Congress and the president for two major pieces of legislation each year. The first is the recurring National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), which says what the military can and cannot do. It is one of the only bills to pass Congress each year since the first one in 1947. The second is an appropriations bill that funds the military—everything from food to medical care to schools to fuel to tanks and airplanes. While the NDAA still passes (though now with more frequent stumbles), Congress is increasingly incapable of passing appropriations bills for the Pentagon, relying instead on continuing resolutions that in essence tell the Department not to change anything. This makes it difficult if not impossible for the military to plan in the long term and in some cases prevents it from changing how it spend money in response to new threats and opportunities. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin has told Congress that legislative uncertainty is a serious risk to maintaining battlefield superiority in the years ahead, especially given the rapidly changing character of warfare. Even just one or two additional continuing resolutions could cede technological leadership to China, according to Secretary of the Air Force Frank Kendall.
The budgetary processes functioned normally for decades. The underlying problem is that polarization is preventing Congress from making tough decisions. While Pentagon budgeteers plan for continuing resolutions into the first quarter of the fiscal year, any further delays result in year-long disruptions to new programs. China and Russia do not have these budgetary and bureaucratic roadblocks. One year of a continuing resolution is unfortunate. Reliving this showdown almost every year becomes unmanageable, eroding battlefield superiority with each successive delay or indecision.
5. Increasing politicization of the military undermines public trust.
The military is among the most esteemed and trusted institutions in the country. But it’s starting to feel like a child being torn by two parents in an ugly divorce. The public is losing trust in the military as elected officials use it for political leverage, further impeding recruitment and retention. The widely publicized standoff over abortion policy—Sen. Tommy Tuberville’s ten-month hold on military nominations—is just one recent example. The military has repeatedly become entangled in culture-war fights, and while these issues might be important, one result is a pincer movement whereby more and more Americans are encouraged to distrust the military, an institution that they need—and that needs them.
THESE FIVE LONG-TERM PRESSURES are not linked to any one party or presidential administration. Rather, they are systemic problems that will continue to squeeze military effectiveness in the years ahead—and our adversaries will seek to take advantage of these weaknesses. So conversations about how best to strengthen our national security must include not only consideration of the right policies, personnel, and technology, but also about the reforms needed to meet these challenges of political dysfunction. After all, our national security depends in part on our ability as a people to govern ourselves—and to be seen by the world governing ourselves.
Stefan Katz is an active-duty member of the U.S. Space Force and a state leader with Veterans for All Voters, an organization dedicated to leveraging veterans’ interests in preserving a free and thriving nation for all voters. The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the official guidance or position of the United States Government, the Department of Defense, or the United States Space Force.
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