Unless that line is within Russia itself, it's not likely to do much. As it is, most of the Russian aerial attacks are glide bombing ones from 40ish km out of the targets. And you can bet that whatever aerial forces are tasked with enforcing the no-fly zone will quickly start to insist that they can't do their jobs properly without strik…
Unless that line is within Russia itself, it's not likely to do much. As it is, most of the Russian aerial attacks are glide bombing ones from 40ish km out of the targets. And you can bet that whatever aerial forces are tasked with enforcing the no-fly zone will quickly start to insist that they can't do their jobs properly without striking at the support network helping the Russian planes stay in the air.
I'd rather do it carefully than "properly," in that sense. The point would be to make Russian pilots and their commanders not want to risk getting in the air so much, or to run away faster when they did cross the line. Not to actually destroy their capability, just to keep them operationally limited over most of Ukraine.
I'm continually amazed at the degree to which commenters underestimate the ability of US and NATO forces to project conventional force over distance with precision. I think that the kind of limited no-fly zone that you suggest here would surprise many Americans on both sides with its effectiveness; the Russians and Ukrainians, who are probably better informed, would be much less surprised. The Russians would probably drastically reduce sorties after the initial losses, or maybe even reduce them pre-emptively to avoid the losses.
Unless that line is within Russia itself, it's not likely to do much. As it is, most of the Russian aerial attacks are glide bombing ones from 40ish km out of the targets. And you can bet that whatever aerial forces are tasked with enforcing the no-fly zone will quickly start to insist that they can't do their jobs properly without striking at the support network helping the Russian planes stay in the air.
I'd rather do it carefully than "properly," in that sense. The point would be to make Russian pilots and their commanders not want to risk getting in the air so much, or to run away faster when they did cross the line. Not to actually destroy their capability, just to keep them operationally limited over most of Ukraine.
I'm continually amazed at the degree to which commenters underestimate the ability of US and NATO forces to project conventional force over distance with precision. I think that the kind of limited no-fly zone that you suggest here would surprise many Americans on both sides with its effectiveness; the Russians and Ukrainians, who are probably better informed, would be much less surprised. The Russians would probably drastically reduce sorties after the initial losses, or maybe even reduce them pre-emptively to avoid the losses.