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Let me apologize, beforehand, for having wrote such a lengthy reply, but I failed to shorten it. I agree that 99% of Bulwark subscribers may understand Ms. Egan’s article as you do. I also know, however, that Bulwark journalists and contributors should not limit the scope of what they publish to high-culture readers. Looking at what the so-called «low culture» did, as claimed in a recent article in The Bulwark, «low culture» voters might successfully sink the US democracy. (Cf. Jim Swift's recent article, dated 22 March in The Bulwark, titled: «The Low Culture that Brought Us Trump.» Even though I'm not a political expert, I'm still willing to share my thoughts. In my view, there is nothing against Trumpian totalitarianism that should not be considered worth divulging and enouncing in a style as direct and clear as simplicity and directness demand for the sake of effective communication. If I did not express my thoughts adequately, I apologize. Defending or supporting someone’s affirmation (or correct to affirm), in my view, implies at least partial agreement. Otherwise, spreading confusion is never justified because reducing or misusing others' rightful access to the best expression of the truth in most circumstances constitutes a crime against the First Amendment (Despite Scalia's and others' interpretations, such as Trump's). Otherwise, the «so help me God» prayer may be hypocritical. Faking news, overtly lying, defaming, or using ill-intended speech to profit or influence others must be criminally punishable, although it is often not. In conclusion, I believe that expressing opinions in public or publishing must never take for granted the differences in perspectives or circumstances. Thus, divulging the truth as it is perceived demands clarity and intentionality, citing sources used as referents, making a good-faith effort not to mislead, and ensuring that everything said is verifiable. There are differences in publications, I agree, but I think that 99% of the readership or audience interprets in a particular way, which one considers the right way, while the 1% supposed to disagree is discriminated against. Such a position might be explainable, but in my view, not justifiable enough, by the arguable morality law of the Principle of double-effect (Cf., for instance, T. A. Cavanaugh, Double-Effect Reasoning, Doing Good And Avoiding Evil, New York, Oxford University Press, Oxford Studies in Theological Ethics, 2006; Cornelius J. Van Der Poel, «The Principle of Double Effect» in Absolutes in moral theology? Curran, Charles E. 1968, 186-210. Free Download, Borrow, and Streaming: Internet Archive, accessed 31 March 2025.

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