Some quick hypothesis about magical thinking in an organization.
1. Can you learn from mistakes or do you have to invent reasons for failures.
2. How is real news treated vs happy news. How you treat your bearers of information creates a feedback loop.
3. Do you have unrealistic understanding of your side? Does your people being Supermen and the enemy being literally retarded affect your assumptions?
4. Is anyone paying attention the the plans or are these just documents that someone needs to have filled out with whatever they dreamed up last night?
These were all incredibly successful (up to a point) leaders, so something they did was counteracting or mitigating the magical aspects. So when and why did that change?
Why was Stalin more successfully pragmatic than Hitler? Because they both were pragmatic, yet only one was "successful" long term
The magical thinking part is critical to understanding russian prewar strategy, yet the only answer I recall from this podcast is that Stalin did it less than Hitler.
There seemed to be no understanding of how bureaucratic structures work, much less why Magical thinkers would be so successful in a particular one other than people like easy answers. Hopefully these gentleman are better writers than their conversations suggest.
Not much here, honestly. Kofman (the russian contingency) does a much better dive into analytical issues with the Ukraine war. Now was the ww2 discussion in much detail or overly insightful (overbearing mothers????)
Two quibbles on this excellent podcast, the first one of Shield of the Republic I have seen. First, I felt a bit uncomfortable about the "magic bullet" slice of the discussion. It began with Hitler being blamed for this by considering, for example, producing missiles to hit NYC and other projects that were seemingly being belittled for not being realistic, then moved to political leaders generally buying into this unrealistic way of thinking. It smacked of Monday morning quarterbacking to me. A belief in an unrealistic magic bullet of Churchill's may be considered to have shortened WWI (tank) and one of Roosevelt's definitely shortened WWII (atom bomb). Perhaps I have misread the thrust of the discussion here, or perhaps there is a reason why the tank, atom bomb, and other "out-there" ideas which come to fruition differ from the magic bullets you were discussing. Anyway, I guess I felt it needed clarification to win me over.
Secondly, I believe the Turkish celebration of Gallipoli on April 26 each year has come to fruition in the past few decades to capatalise on the significant Australian and New Zealand tourism to the area each year to celebrate ANZAC Day (Australian and New Zealand Army Corps). ANZAC Day started in Australia immediately after the ending of WWI, as a memorial day for the soldiers killed in battle at the Gallipoli slaughter. ANZAC Day is probably Australia's biggest holiday after Christmas, and all around the country people gather at dawn for a memorial service on April 26, the morning of the first landings of the Australian troops at Gapllipoli. Australian and New Zealander travellers would gather at ANZAC Cove each year for a dawn memorial service, and this group gradually grew during the '70s, '80s and '90s (it was still a relatively small affair the year I went, in 1980). The Turks caught on, and were invited to join in. So, I don't believe Turkey instigated their Gallipoli invasion ceremonies, but only fairly recently (I'm 70 years old, so for me "fairly recently" means anything in the past half century) hooked onto the national Australian memorial day. I'm not absolutely certain, but this is a clearer take on the situation than the one I believe, from your quick comment, that Eric has.
Hitler was also mindful, to a certain degree, of the economic aspects of military strategy. In 1942 he initiated a 2nd prong (besides Stalingrad) into his offensive into southern Russia to move into the eastern Ukraine, southern Russia, and the Caucasus oil fields. He valued the foodstuffs from Ukraine (knowing that the British blockade in WW I almost starved Imperial Germany) and the oil from the Caucasus (and Romania as well), and was quoted as saying “my generals don’t understand the economics of this war,” or something like that.
With regard to logistics trumping strategy, as Eric Edelman frequently says, I’m reminded that Japanese naval officers in WW II did not like doing convoy escort duty thinking it was beneath them, preferring to engage in less defensive and more aggressive warfare. Consequently, many supplies heading for Japan were sunk by U.S. submarines.
One of my favorite podcasts and this discussion was as insightful as always. The Strategists is a good book and the Ukraine analysis highly overdue and inspired. Audio quality feedback: The volume of The Shield of the Republic is too low (lower than other podcasts).
Some quick hypothesis about magical thinking in an organization.
1. Can you learn from mistakes or do you have to invent reasons for failures.
2. How is real news treated vs happy news. How you treat your bearers of information creates a feedback loop.
3. Do you have unrealistic understanding of your side? Does your people being Supermen and the enemy being literally retarded affect your assumptions?
4. Is anyone paying attention the the plans or are these just documents that someone needs to have filled out with whatever they dreamed up last night?
These were all incredibly successful (up to a point) leaders, so something they did was counteracting or mitigating the magical aspects. So when and why did that change?
Why was Stalin more successfully pragmatic than Hitler? Because they both were pragmatic, yet only one was "successful" long term
The magical thinking part is critical to understanding russian prewar strategy, yet the only answer I recall from this podcast is that Stalin did it less than Hitler.
There seemed to be no understanding of how bureaucratic structures work, much less why Magical thinkers would be so successful in a particular one other than people like easy answers. Hopefully these gentleman are better writers than their conversations suggest.
Not much here, honestly. Kofman (the russian contingency) does a much better dive into analytical issues with the Ukraine war. Now was the ww2 discussion in much detail or overly insightful (overbearing mothers????)
Two quibbles on this excellent podcast, the first one of Shield of the Republic I have seen. First, I felt a bit uncomfortable about the "magic bullet" slice of the discussion. It began with Hitler being blamed for this by considering, for example, producing missiles to hit NYC and other projects that were seemingly being belittled for not being realistic, then moved to political leaders generally buying into this unrealistic way of thinking. It smacked of Monday morning quarterbacking to me. A belief in an unrealistic magic bullet of Churchill's may be considered to have shortened WWI (tank) and one of Roosevelt's definitely shortened WWII (atom bomb). Perhaps I have misread the thrust of the discussion here, or perhaps there is a reason why the tank, atom bomb, and other "out-there" ideas which come to fruition differ from the magic bullets you were discussing. Anyway, I guess I felt it needed clarification to win me over.
Secondly, I believe the Turkish celebration of Gallipoli on April 26 each year has come to fruition in the past few decades to capatalise on the significant Australian and New Zealand tourism to the area each year to celebrate ANZAC Day (Australian and New Zealand Army Corps). ANZAC Day started in Australia immediately after the ending of WWI, as a memorial day for the soldiers killed in battle at the Gallipoli slaughter. ANZAC Day is probably Australia's biggest holiday after Christmas, and all around the country people gather at dawn for a memorial service on April 26, the morning of the first landings of the Australian troops at Gapllipoli. Australian and New Zealander travellers would gather at ANZAC Cove each year for a dawn memorial service, and this group gradually grew during the '70s, '80s and '90s (it was still a relatively small affair the year I went, in 1980). The Turks caught on, and were invited to join in. So, I don't believe Turkey instigated their Gallipoli invasion ceremonies, but only fairly recently (I'm 70 years old, so for me "fairly recently" means anything in the past half century) hooked onto the national Australian memorial day. I'm not absolutely certain, but this is a clearer take on the situation than the one I believe, from your quick comment, that Eric has.
Thank you.
Hitler was also mindful, to a certain degree, of the economic aspects of military strategy. In 1942 he initiated a 2nd prong (besides Stalingrad) into his offensive into southern Russia to move into the eastern Ukraine, southern Russia, and the Caucasus oil fields. He valued the foodstuffs from Ukraine (knowing that the British blockade in WW I almost starved Imperial Germany) and the oil from the Caucasus (and Romania as well), and was quoted as saying “my generals don’t understand the economics of this war,” or something like that.
With regard to logistics trumping strategy, as Eric Edelman frequently says, I’m reminded that Japanese naval officers in WW II did not like doing convoy escort duty thinking it was beneath them, preferring to engage in less defensive and more aggressive warfare. Consequently, many supplies heading for Japan were sunk by U.S. submarines.
That's a beautiful rug behind you, Mr. Edelman. How many knots per square inch?
Interesting and valuable episode. Thank you.
One of my favorite podcasts and this discussion was as insightful as always. The Strategists is a good book and the Ukraine analysis highly overdue and inspired. Audio quality feedback: The volume of The Shield of the Republic is too low (lower than other podcasts).