War-Weary Electorate Leaves Harris Little Room to Maneuver on Ukraine
But there are still three things she could do as president to help the country’s defense.
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS ARE RARELY DECIDED on foreign policy, and this year will be no exception. But poll after poll shows a deepening, bipartisan fatigue with foreign entanglements.
The question we face, as important as who will be the next president, is will America slide into isolationism and a disastrous retreat from world affairs?
A new survey by the Wall Street Journal placed that fatigue in stark relief. It asked voters in seven battleground states which presidential candidate they thought was best equipped to guide American foreign policy—specifically, the conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East. The result was stunning. Trump leads by a mile: 50 percent to 39 percent on who is best able to handle the war in Ukraine and 48 percent to 33 percent on managing the contest between Israel and Hamas. Also striking, on this issue, the former president enjoys a wide lead among independent voters and even garners significant support among Democrats.
“He’s the antiwar candidate,” one Democrat in Pennsylvania told pollsters. “He says he wants people to stop dying, and that sounds good.”
Americans aren’t turning away from the world completely. On Ukraine, for example, a July 2024 survey by the Pew Research Center found 48 percent agreeing that “the U.S. has a responsibility to help Ukraine defend itself from Russia’s invasion.” And a stalwart, bipartisan group of senators, including Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.) and Richard Blumenthal (D-Conn.), continue to support military aid.
The MAGA wing of the Republican party has naturally fallen in line behind Trump, pushing for a ceasefire and an end to U.S. support. “I have no desire to continue funding Ukraine,” House Speaker Mike Johnson declared this month, “and I hope there is no need for it.” This is a troubling sign: Johnson’s leadership was indispensable to passing $61 billion in aid to Ukraine in April. But what’s most dangerous and alarming was that the Wall Street Journal poll showed a large faction of Democrats now agree with the GOP.
Contrast this with attitudes in Europe. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky toured the continent last week, garnering promises of additional support from Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom. Poland, the Netherlands, Scandinavia, and the Baltic states, though not among the stops on this trip, are the most steadfastly supportive of stopping a Russian advance they know could soon be coming to their doorsteps. Every few days brings news of new assistance for Ukraine: from the European Union, from Germany, from Norway. And the numbers add up. According to the Kiel Institute for the World Economy, from the start of the war through August 2024, Europe allocated or committed just over $296 billion—far outstripping America’s $109 billion.
The difference between American and European thinking was on full display earlier this month at the Warsaw Security Forum. The meeting brought together some 2,500 high-level diplomats and defense experts under the Chatham House rule, which prohibits quoting participants by name. Virtually all those involved were strong supporters of Ukraine, but their reasons varied dramatically.
One American elected official detailed the U.S. interests at stake in Europe as protecting Americans living abroad, safeguarding U.S. troops stationed in Europe, facilitating trade, and “degrading Russia.” These are all important steps. But they are also largely transactional and far from the existential reasons offered by most Europeans, who feel that their way of life is threatened by growing Russian aggression, not just their security.
“We all want to wake up in a free society,” one northern European defense minister explained. “It’s about freedom of speech, human rights, freedom to travel and live as you wish—versus no respect for international law.”
The message repeated in session after session of the forum was that it’s not enough for Ukraine to “win” the war, Russia must lose.
Few if any Americans see the goal this way. Even Kamala Harris, who has mounted a stirring defense of the need to stand by our European allies in support of Ukraine, stops short of suggesting that Russia should lose. Her focus, she explained on 60 Minutes this month—choosing her words with precision—has been “on supporting Ukraine’s ability to defend itself against Russia’s unprovoked aggression.”
But winning, and defeating Russia, will take a lot more than defense.
Still, even with a growing number of Americans clamoring for a retreat from the world, there is some good news. As recently as January 2023, when Ukraine looked plucky and resilient and in position to beat back the Russian assault, nearly 70 percent of the public, Democrats and Republicans, believed that the United States was doing just “the right amount” or “not enough” to support the war. If Kyiv appeared to take the upper hand now, and people could see a path to winning, perhaps the tide of public opinion would turn again.
Another defense appropriation would be the most obvious step to help change this dynamic. The problem is that even if Harris wins in November, it’s not clear whether Congress will support additional funding.
But even without money, or much money, there are three other powerful actions Washington could take.
A most straightforward step would be lifting our restrictions on using Western weapons to strike military targets—oil fields, airfields, and arms depots—deep inside Russia. A long list of European countries, from the U.K. to Poland, have come out in support of this idea, as has the European Parliament. A large group of former U.S. ambassadors and high-ranking officers, including Gen. Philip Breedlove, Gen. Wesley Clark, and Lt. Gen. Ben Hodges, has pleaded with the president to lift the ban, and there is bipartisan support in Congress, too. Still, Biden holds back, a refusal that effectively nixes the use of any European weapons.
A second step, popular in Europe but also blocked by Biden, would be a formal invitation for Ukraine to join NATO. Nothing would do more to guarantee Ukrainian security and perhaps speed the end of the war.
This would require a significant commitment from Europe and the United States. NATO Article 5 promises that an armed attack against a member will be considered “an armed attack against all members,” and that the alliance “will take the actions it deems necessary to assist the Ally attacked.” It would also take a long time for Kyiv to join the alliance, requiring peace in Ukraine and a detailed NATO strategic plan for defending the war-torn country. But it would be a huge boost for Ukrainian morale and an unmistakable signal to Putin.
The NATO summit in Washington last summer declared that Ukraine was on an “irreversible” path to membership in the alliance, but that’s very different from an actual invitation to join. Sens. Graham and Blumenthal, in the meantime, have proposed an intermediate step: labeling Ukraine as a Major Non-NATO Ally with the same rights and privileges granted to Israel, Japan, and South Korea, among other close foreign partners. That would be significant. But it’s far from sure that Congress will pass the legislation in a lame duck session, and there’s a better option: Biden could get out ahead of the bill, clearing the way to invite Ukraine to join NATO before he leaves office in January.
A third and last step would be clearing the way for a coalition of willing European countries to shoot down Russian missiles and drones, both as a means of intercepting aerial threats that stray into their airspace and to help Kyiv destroy incoming rockets over Ukrainian territory. In the past two-and-a-half years, Russian missiles and drones have appeared over Poland, Latvia, Romania, Bulgaria, and Croatia, sometimes crashing to earth and often causing the country to scramble its fighter jets. NATO has dismissed the idea, fearing that a clash could implicate Article 5. But in this case, too, the United States holds the key—and a word from Biden would likely sweep away the opposition.
Might these three items be the start of a foreign policy to-do list for Harris? Or better yet—sooner and more certain—could they offer a way for Biden to cement his global legacy? He has hesitated so far, proposing needed aid and encouraging Congress to pass it, but hesitating to send the most advanced weapons and restricting their use—allowing Ukraine to defend itself yet not defeat Russia. But this could be his chance—an opportunity to make a historic difference, protecting the world from Russian aggression and from the notion, as dangerous in the long run for the United States as for Europe, that might makes right.
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