Elliot: 'There appears to be a large area of Ukraine (west) unaffected by military operations. Looking at the difficulties the Russians have had with supply lines, couldn't a 'tactical withdrawal' of armed forces, stringing out these lines further, and a caretaker govt in Lviv, help Ukraine?'
When I was young I was a dead ringer for Henry Thomas in ET. I was teased mercilessly with "ET phone home" and "Eliot" jokes. Did mr Cohen suffer the same fate and would he share the name of his therapist
Pentagon numbers just out : Only 5% of Russian arms and vehicles in Ukraine have been destroyed.
Take that in for a second. All of those videos you see of Russian tanks, APCs, and helicopters getting blown up merely constituted less than 5% of the Russian war machine inside of Ukraine.
War, like many other things, is all about assessing rates of change. Do not let anecdotes paint a pretty picture for you that the big numbers easily dispel. Get ready for cities to fall, and get ready for open insurgency, more war-criming, and more human catastrophe in the weeks/months ahead.
At one time the US had means of getting an alternate, uncensored narrative past the Iron Curtain via the "Voice of America" and "Radio Free Europe". These programs were gutted or filled with Bannon loyalists during the Trump administration. It was curious to see senior people in the Executive branch get involved, now it seems a bit sinister.
Having most Russia's military in Ukraine would seem to put Russia in a very precarious position with regard to being able to fend off other threats. Could a military threat on a distant Russia to region force a partial withdrawal from Ukraine? How does this situation change Russia's willingness to use tactical or strategic nuclear weapons. How is the embarrassing performance of Russia's military in Ukraine likely to change Russia's defence spending going forward?
Thank you for hosting Eliot Cohen. What a treat for us Bulwark+ members to get to hear from him directly. Here is my question. If Putin feels like he is losing and will be humiliated on the world stage, it seems as though the incentive to try something desperate increases. As I understand it, he has a large arsenal of tactical nukes (in addition to of course a large arsenal of larger nuclear weapons). What is the disincentive for him to use a tactical nuke especially since it sends a message to the West that ALL options are on the table and we should stay out of this fight—either directly or through arming an insurgency. If he were to use such a weapon, how should we respond?
I love and respect JVL, but the promotion of Eliot Cohen has knocked my legs out from under me. Eliot Cohen was disastrously wrong on Iraq and that harmed the United States more than any event since the Civil War. He's not someone that any thinking person should spend two minutes listening to. Hugely disappointed.
I disagree with this verdict pretty strongly. You can make a case that the cost-benefit of Iraq and/or Afghanistan was clearly in the red. You can make a case that the opportunity cost of Iraq was large because without it, the US could have accomplished A, B, or C.
But you also have to grapple with the fact that regime change in Iraq also had outcomes—such as the Arab spring, such as the evolution from an autocracy which was counter to American interests to a semi-functioning democracy that is loosely aligned with American interests—that are net goods.
I think Iraq did much more damage to American standing in the world than the World Wars (which improved our standing among other nations) or even Vietnam (which to be sure did significant damage). After Iraq, we were no longer seen as a beacon of freedom and democracy, but a bully who invaded a oil rich country on obviously false pretenses because no one could stop us. And then totally botched the job.
I also have to disagree that regime change in Iraq had other positive outcomes for American interests. It removed an implacable opponent of Iran and replaced it with a Shia controlled regime that was at best Finlandized and often overtly friendly to Iranian interests. Post-revolutionary Iran has never had more power in the Middle East than it does today and that is due in large part to a war that Mr. Cohen cheerled (in terms that were often dishonest).
I also have yet to see any evidence that the Arab spring was in any way motivated by our invasion of Iraq. It was led by people who had been fed up with generations of rule by violent extremely corrupt elites. How would our removal of a Sunni violent corrupt elite and installation of a Shia violent ridiculously corrupt elite with horrific outcomes for Sunnis inspire a revolution by Sunnis in other countries against their own local elites?
Again, I am huge fan, JVL. But I couldn't disagree more with you about Iraq. It was a terrible, terrible mistake.
Iraq was a mess before it was a mess. Just like Iran. Our successes always seem to make our failures. We were so clever taking down Mossadegh, until we weren't. So to fix that we propped up Saddam. But then that became the problem, twice.
So to fix that we try again. JVL's point is, at least for now Iraq is a success in that it isn't Iran.
Does that mean that had we not pulled off the Iranian coup two years before I was born we would not have had Iran vs Iraq or Afghanistan and the lesser Bush and all the rest? Very possibly. But maybe it would be even worse.
Putin may or may not be making strategic blunders -- I tend to think he's in a much better position than most here seem to think, but we'll see -- but pretty much everything the US did strategically in Vietnam, the Middle East, Afghanistan, was one strategic tie-your-shoelaces-together-and-fall-on-your-face stupid debacle after another.
But history is funny (funny peculiar, not funny hah-hah). Sometimes the face plant from tying your shoelaces together may prevent you from running into a death trap down the road.
How all this turns out -- this much I predict: it won't be what you think it will be, whatever that is, but it isn't going to be good. This is an intelligent, thoughtful community of serious people doing their best to find answers that will help the arc of history bend toward -- justice, or at least not depravity. Many offer ideas with considerable confidence that the proffered course of action is the way through Moria and back out into the sunlight. I just have to say -- we need to be very skeptical that anything we try is not going to be disastrous.
America more than any other power was responsible for Saddam in the first place and from a karmic perspective it was our responsibility to try and clean up the mess. I go along with JVL that badly as we botched it, we didn't botch it as badly as we did Cambodia and Vietnam. We made NATO to save Europe from being entirely absorbed into Stalin's empire and like it or not it's our responsibility to stand by it now; too many peoples are stuck counting on it to hold off Putin's resurgent empire. We "won" the cold war and out of that some pieces of Stalin's empire were freed finally to have some hope of a better polity and economic future. Even those not in NATO are in a real sense orphans whose predicament is the result of our actions, even though what we actually can do now to protect them ranges from very little to nothing at all.
I think one of the things that made Marxism so appealing, particularly to intellectually inclined elites of a certain personality, was that it seemed to offer what every poor bastard waiting helplessly in a trench while being shelled by history wants more than anything else: escape the powerlessness. The marxist "science" of history offered the illusion that after all, it really did make sense, and even more than that, you can actually know the consequences of whatever the hell you are trying to do.
It is so enticing to fool one's self into imagining that the future is something you have some influence over. And of course we do have influence; our actions determine the future; it's just that we can't guess what that influence will be.
We are helping Ukraine in the ways that we can without starting a nuclear 3rd WW…with that said, how will the Ukrainians feel about us once this is all over?
If we do the right thing - I think they'll like us. More than that, they'll really be one of us.
That includes reconstruction funds - I'd suggest maybe 2/3 EU and 1/3 US money. It doesn't have to be a full-on Marshall Plan, unless it takes another 2 months for the active hostilities to be over and Ukrainian cities and infrastructure are absolutely flattened. It also means Ukraine joining the EU within a few years of the end of hostilities, and at least some formal bilateral or multilateral defense agreements like Ukraine/Poland, Ukraine/Turkey.
If we don't - and especially if it's a matter of European platitudes without hard cash, then all bets are off. I'm looking at you, Germany/France/Italy/UK. Ukraine in 2025 could be what Spain was in 1986; and Ukraine in 2050 could be what Spain is today, or even better.
Vickers is terrific. Biden should hire him and we'll get the show on the road. I'm sure this will irritate some of your intellectual readers. I am not cautious about this situation. I am of Russian descent born in Boston Mass and I say Putin needs to go away by any means possible. He has hurt my people and is destroying humans in Ukraine, our brother.
We seem to be severely constrained by the reality of Putin's nuclear arsenal.
Mr. Cohen, my question is whether that is the reality. We have seen the vaunted Russian army flummoxed by failed leadership, faulty tactical models, outdated, cheap equipment and useless technological innovations. Are we sure or can we be better informed as to the technical capability of their nuclear threat?
I keep thinking back to the nuclear sub that imploded and how they not only didn't want help, they weren't able to save the sailors on board. Their culture since 1915 has been founded on fakery and illusion, telling the boss what he wanted to hear.
Not suggesting we test it but imagine the strategy if we knew they were 'disarmed.'
Good question. Also, a corollary Q: I've read some about the nuclear chain of command (it's obviously not a "red button"). What is our understanding of the willingness of that nuclear chain of command to actually execute a launch order, knowing it could be a planet-level extinction event? What is the likelihood of back-channel communication (even now) or HUMINT inside the Kremlin?
Is it possible that Putin might compromise by allowing what is left of Ukraine to join the EU as long as it doesn't join NATO? The two have different effects on Russian interests one which Russia can tolerate and the other not.
Why do we care what Putin wants relative to the Ukraine? It's up to the Ukrainians to decide how long they will resist; our moral and ethical obligation is to support them any way we can.
The discussion JVL put forward was about what would happen should Putin prevail and if he does prevail we will have to care what Putin wants.
Support for Ukraine does not preclude the possibility of Ukraine losing and what that would look like going forward. Even f there is no clear victor and there is a negotiated settlement Putin will have plenty to say about the terms of the settlement.
Several commentators have always discussed EU and NATO membership in tandem when in reality they are not connected. Ukraine could belong to one and not the other. Might Putin accept this division of membership? That was my question for the experts on the podcast.
Some time back, I read an article discussing life after Vladimir Putin, and how the leadership / governments of Lenin, Stalin, Kruschev, Brezhnev and Putin all differed in significant ways. The implication of the article was that the shape of the Russian state would evolve based on who emerged as the next head of government.
So my question for Eliot Cohen would be, what do the next several years looks like assuming Putin stays in power and Russia remains a pariah state. As Putin ages and (presumably) becomes more vulnerable, how does the next leader arise? Should we expect another long-term leader to emerge, or a period of jockeying a la Malenkov, Beria and Kruschev?
What's his message to the Russian people? Does he triple down on Z-like toxic nationalism, or does he promise a better life re-engaging with the West?
The ceasefire terms outlined here would constitute a complete negation of Ukrainian sovereignty. And they would till have Russia cued up to roll over them the next time that whim strikes.
I have only one question for Eliot, and every other observer. Does the West finally, finally understand that Putin must be vaporized, that this is the moment to galvanize and make that happen in by any and all means necessary?
I think so far, Molly McKew has best met the moment in describing what is at stake and the opportunity - the mandate - before us:
“But imagine the world if we save Ukraine. Imagine the century we might have then.
Ukraine is the crucial battle that will shape the century. The clash of ideas that we must win. Here it is, on a Ukrainian battlefield. It is this. From this moment, from victory in Ukraine, comes the stronger, better century that we hope for. If we miss it, it will not come again.”
Yes, the US / NATO must destroy Putin for invading Ukraine. But...I think they must do it with economic sanctions and do everything possible to avoid escalation to WWIII. If Putin escalates, fine - we do what has to be done to end him. But the US must maintain the high ground and do everything possible to avoid entering the war. This is a defining moment in geo-politics. If the West is able to destroy Russia without firing a shot, it is possible that this will be the end of war in our lifetime. How does any country justify the cost of an illegal war if they know their economy will be ruined and that their opponents will be provided enough munitions to devastate their military over the course of an attempted long term occupation? China has to be watching what the West is doing to Russia's economy and realizing that the cost of invading Taiwan would destabilize their country and possibly lead to regime change.
Sure thing. Whatever you want to call the “means” or the “shots fired” of this war. Like I said, any and all methods, tactics, screws, sanctions, materiel, money, intel. It’s all in for as long as it takes. We are already at war. Many argue this is Year 9. I’d like to see a definitive end sooner rather than later. Whether Mad Vlad remains breathing matters not, tho I do have a preference.
Given what Putin has done to Ukraine there is no turning back. The NATO can not allow this to pass. If we do, we will be back in this position in another 5 years. The West must stop the invasion and then build back and arm Ukraine and allow it to become a NATO member. Failure to do so will lead Putin to further aggression.
Question for Eliot Cohen: given the alarming probability of the isolationist Trump or his heirs reclaiming power, is it prudent for America's allies (Europe, Canada, Japan, etc) to begin building independent militaries and alliances that don't rely on American military might?
Elliot: 'There appears to be a large area of Ukraine (west) unaffected by military operations. Looking at the difficulties the Russians have had with supply lines, couldn't a 'tactical withdrawal' of armed forces, stringing out these lines further, and a caretaker govt in Lviv, help Ukraine?'
When I was young I was a dead ringer for Henry Thomas in ET. I was teased mercilessly with "ET phone home" and "Eliot" jokes. Did mr Cohen suffer the same fate and would he share the name of his therapist
For me it was Jonathan Taylor Thomas or the youngest Hanson. I feel your pain.
Pentagon numbers just out : Only 5% of Russian arms and vehicles in Ukraine have been destroyed.
Take that in for a second. All of those videos you see of Russian tanks, APCs, and helicopters getting blown up merely constituted less than 5% of the Russian war machine inside of Ukraine.
War, like many other things, is all about assessing rates of change. Do not let anecdotes paint a pretty picture for you that the big numbers easily dispel. Get ready for cities to fall, and get ready for open insurgency, more war-criming, and more human catastrophe in the weeks/months ahead.
At one time the US had means of getting an alternate, uncensored narrative past the Iron Curtain via the "Voice of America" and "Radio Free Europe". These programs were gutted or filled with Bannon loyalists during the Trump administration. It was curious to see senior people in the Executive branch get involved, now it seems a bit sinister.
r.e. Questions for Elliot Cohen:
Having most Russia's military in Ukraine would seem to put Russia in a very precarious position with regard to being able to fend off other threats. Could a military threat on a distant Russia to region force a partial withdrawal from Ukraine? How does this situation change Russia's willingness to use tactical or strategic nuclear weapons. How is the embarrassing performance of Russia's military in Ukraine likely to change Russia's defence spending going forward?
JVL
Thank you for hosting Eliot Cohen. What a treat for us Bulwark+ members to get to hear from him directly. Here is my question. If Putin feels like he is losing and will be humiliated on the world stage, it seems as though the incentive to try something desperate increases. As I understand it, he has a large arsenal of tactical nukes (in addition to of course a large arsenal of larger nuclear weapons). What is the disincentive for him to use a tactical nuke especially since it sends a message to the West that ALL options are on the table and we should stay out of this fight—either directly or through arming an insurgency. If he were to use such a weapon, how should we respond?
I love and respect JVL, but the promotion of Eliot Cohen has knocked my legs out from under me. Eliot Cohen was disastrously wrong on Iraq and that harmed the United States more than any event since the Civil War. He's not someone that any thinking person should spend two minutes listening to. Hugely disappointed.
More than Vietnam? More than WWI or WWII?
I disagree with this verdict pretty strongly. You can make a case that the cost-benefit of Iraq and/or Afghanistan was clearly in the red. You can make a case that the opportunity cost of Iraq was large because without it, the US could have accomplished A, B, or C.
But you also have to grapple with the fact that regime change in Iraq also had outcomes—such as the Arab spring, such as the evolution from an autocracy which was counter to American interests to a semi-functioning democracy that is loosely aligned with American interests—that are net goods.
Sorry Jonathan - I call nonsense on these two paragraphs
I think Iraq did much more damage to American standing in the world than the World Wars (which improved our standing among other nations) or even Vietnam (which to be sure did significant damage). After Iraq, we were no longer seen as a beacon of freedom and democracy, but a bully who invaded a oil rich country on obviously false pretenses because no one could stop us. And then totally botched the job.
I also have to disagree that regime change in Iraq had other positive outcomes for American interests. It removed an implacable opponent of Iran and replaced it with a Shia controlled regime that was at best Finlandized and often overtly friendly to Iranian interests. Post-revolutionary Iran has never had more power in the Middle East than it does today and that is due in large part to a war that Mr. Cohen cheerled (in terms that were often dishonest).
I also have yet to see any evidence that the Arab spring was in any way motivated by our invasion of Iraq. It was led by people who had been fed up with generations of rule by violent extremely corrupt elites. How would our removal of a Sunni violent corrupt elite and installation of a Shia violent ridiculously corrupt elite with horrific outcomes for Sunnis inspire a revolution by Sunnis in other countries against their own local elites?
Again, I am huge fan, JVL. But I couldn't disagree more with you about Iraq. It was a terrible, terrible mistake.
Iraq was a mess before it was a mess. Just like Iran. Our successes always seem to make our failures. We were so clever taking down Mossadegh, until we weren't. So to fix that we propped up Saddam. But then that became the problem, twice.
So to fix that we try again. JVL's point is, at least for now Iraq is a success in that it isn't Iran.
Does that mean that had we not pulled off the Iranian coup two years before I was born we would not have had Iran vs Iraq or Afghanistan and the lesser Bush and all the rest? Very possibly. But maybe it would be even worse.
Putin may or may not be making strategic blunders -- I tend to think he's in a much better position than most here seem to think, but we'll see -- but pretty much everything the US did strategically in Vietnam, the Middle East, Afghanistan, was one strategic tie-your-shoelaces-together-and-fall-on-your-face stupid debacle after another.
But history is funny (funny peculiar, not funny hah-hah). Sometimes the face plant from tying your shoelaces together may prevent you from running into a death trap down the road.
How all this turns out -- this much I predict: it won't be what you think it will be, whatever that is, but it isn't going to be good. This is an intelligent, thoughtful community of serious people doing their best to find answers that will help the arc of history bend toward -- justice, or at least not depravity. Many offer ideas with considerable confidence that the proffered course of action is the way through Moria and back out into the sunlight. I just have to say -- we need to be very skeptical that anything we try is not going to be disastrous.
America more than any other power was responsible for Saddam in the first place and from a karmic perspective it was our responsibility to try and clean up the mess. I go along with JVL that badly as we botched it, we didn't botch it as badly as we did Cambodia and Vietnam. We made NATO to save Europe from being entirely absorbed into Stalin's empire and like it or not it's our responsibility to stand by it now; too many peoples are stuck counting on it to hold off Putin's resurgent empire. We "won" the cold war and out of that some pieces of Stalin's empire were freed finally to have some hope of a better polity and economic future. Even those not in NATO are in a real sense orphans whose predicament is the result of our actions, even though what we actually can do now to protect them ranges from very little to nothing at all.
I think one of the things that made Marxism so appealing, particularly to intellectually inclined elites of a certain personality, was that it seemed to offer what every poor bastard waiting helplessly in a trench while being shelled by history wants more than anything else: escape the powerlessness. The marxist "science" of history offered the illusion that after all, it really did make sense, and even more than that, you can actually know the consequences of whatever the hell you are trying to do.
It is so enticing to fool one's self into imagining that the future is something you have some influence over. And of course we do have influence; our actions determine the future; it's just that we can't guess what that influence will be.
Completely agree with you Milton. You are spot on.
Thanks for reminding us of this! I had forgotten about his WSJ editorial promoting American intervention in Iran and Iraq.
@JVL - You should have him apologize to everyone on the livestream for his catastrophically bad call on Iraq.
We are helping Ukraine in the ways that we can without starting a nuclear 3rd WW…with that said, how will the Ukrainians feel about us once this is all over?
I think it depends on what "all over" means.
If we do the right thing - I think they'll like us. More than that, they'll really be one of us.
That includes reconstruction funds - I'd suggest maybe 2/3 EU and 1/3 US money. It doesn't have to be a full-on Marshall Plan, unless it takes another 2 months for the active hostilities to be over and Ukrainian cities and infrastructure are absolutely flattened. It also means Ukraine joining the EU within a few years of the end of hostilities, and at least some formal bilateral or multilateral defense agreements like Ukraine/Poland, Ukraine/Turkey.
If we don't - and especially if it's a matter of European platitudes without hard cash, then all bets are off. I'm looking at you, Germany/France/Italy/UK. Ukraine in 2025 could be what Spain was in 1986; and Ukraine in 2050 could be what Spain is today, or even better.
Vickers is terrific. Biden should hire him and we'll get the show on the road. I'm sure this will irritate some of your intellectual readers. I am not cautious about this situation. I am of Russian descent born in Boston Mass and I say Putin needs to go away by any means possible. He has hurt my people and is destroying humans in Ukraine, our brother.
We seem to be severely constrained by the reality of Putin's nuclear arsenal.
Mr. Cohen, my question is whether that is the reality. We have seen the vaunted Russian army flummoxed by failed leadership, faulty tactical models, outdated, cheap equipment and useless technological innovations. Are we sure or can we be better informed as to the technical capability of their nuclear threat?
I keep thinking back to the nuclear sub that imploded and how they not only didn't want help, they weren't able to save the sailors on board. Their culture since 1915 has been founded on fakery and illusion, telling the boss what he wanted to hear.
Not suggesting we test it but imagine the strategy if we knew they were 'disarmed.'
Good question. Also, a corollary Q: I've read some about the nuclear chain of command (it's obviously not a "red button"). What is our understanding of the willingness of that nuclear chain of command to actually execute a launch order, knowing it could be a planet-level extinction event? What is the likelihood of back-channel communication (even now) or HUMINT inside the Kremlin?
Well said. All good questions.
I second that question.
Is it possible that Putin might compromise by allowing what is left of Ukraine to join the EU as long as it doesn't join NATO? The two have different effects on Russian interests one which Russia can tolerate and the other not.
Why do we care what Putin wants relative to the Ukraine? It's up to the Ukrainians to decide how long they will resist; our moral and ethical obligation is to support them any way we can.
The discussion JVL put forward was about what would happen should Putin prevail and if he does prevail we will have to care what Putin wants.
Support for Ukraine does not preclude the possibility of Ukraine losing and what that would look like going forward. Even f there is no clear victor and there is a negotiated settlement Putin will have plenty to say about the terms of the settlement.
Several commentators have always discussed EU and NATO membership in tandem when in reality they are not connected. Ukraine could belong to one and not the other. Might Putin accept this division of membership? That was my question for the experts on the podcast.
Some time back, I read an article discussing life after Vladimir Putin, and how the leadership / governments of Lenin, Stalin, Kruschev, Brezhnev and Putin all differed in significant ways. The implication of the article was that the shape of the Russian state would evolve based on who emerged as the next head of government.
So my question for Eliot Cohen would be, what do the next several years looks like assuming Putin stays in power and Russia remains a pariah state. As Putin ages and (presumably) becomes more vulnerable, how does the next leader arise? Should we expect another long-term leader to emerge, or a period of jockeying a la Malenkov, Beria and Kruschev?
What's his message to the Russian people? Does he triple down on Z-like toxic nationalism, or does he promise a better life re-engaging with the West?
The ceasefire terms outlined here would constitute a complete negation of Ukrainian sovereignty. And they would till have Russia cued up to roll over them the next time that whim strikes.
I have only one question for Eliot, and every other observer. Does the West finally, finally understand that Putin must be vaporized, that this is the moment to galvanize and make that happen in by any and all means necessary?
I think so far, Molly McKew has best met the moment in describing what is at stake and the opportunity - the mandate - before us:
“But imagine the world if we save Ukraine. Imagine the century we might have then.
Ukraine is the crucial battle that will shape the century. The clash of ideas that we must win. Here it is, on a Ukrainian battlefield. It is this. From this moment, from victory in Ukraine, comes the stronger, better century that we hope for. If we miss it, it will not come again.”
Yes, the US / NATO must destroy Putin for invading Ukraine. But...I think they must do it with economic sanctions and do everything possible to avoid escalation to WWIII. If Putin escalates, fine - we do what has to be done to end him. But the US must maintain the high ground and do everything possible to avoid entering the war. This is a defining moment in geo-politics. If the West is able to destroy Russia without firing a shot, it is possible that this will be the end of war in our lifetime. How does any country justify the cost of an illegal war if they know their economy will be ruined and that their opponents will be provided enough munitions to devastate their military over the course of an attempted long term occupation? China has to be watching what the West is doing to Russia's economy and realizing that the cost of invading Taiwan would destabilize their country and possibly lead to regime change.
Sure thing. Whatever you want to call the “means” or the “shots fired” of this war. Like I said, any and all methods, tactics, screws, sanctions, materiel, money, intel. It’s all in for as long as it takes. We are already at war. Many argue this is Year 9. I’d like to see a definitive end sooner rather than later. Whether Mad Vlad remains breathing matters not, tho I do have a preference.
Given what Putin has done to Ukraine there is no turning back. The NATO can not allow this to pass. If we do, we will be back in this position in another 5 years. The West must stop the invasion and then build back and arm Ukraine and allow it to become a NATO member. Failure to do so will lead Putin to further aggression.
Question for Eliot Cohen: given the alarming probability of the isolationist Trump or his heirs reclaiming power, is it prudent for America's allies (Europe, Canada, Japan, etc) to begin building independent militaries and alliances that don't rely on American military might?