‘They’re Going To Want To Make Iran Feel The Pain’
What comes next in the increasingly tense Israel-Iran conflict
Iran’s decision to launch a barrage of missiles at Israel Tuesday, has raised the specter of a larger outbreak in regional violence. And it’s raised the question of just what Israel, and the United States, should do next.
To answer those questions, The Bulwark spoke to Amb. Eric Edelman, former under secretary of defense for policy. Edelman is co-host of The Bulwark’s Shield of the Republic podcast. This interview has been edited for length and clarity.
The Bulwark: Iran’s attack is over, but it’s all very raw still. Can you walk us through the basics of what we know and what we still don’t know?
Eric Edelman: In April, when Iran launched what up until that time had been the largest and most complex [rocket and missile] attack on Israel, it was a combination of drones, cruise missiles which fly relatively slowly, and ballistic missiles, which fly much more quickly. As a result of the fact that they launched the drones at the outset, the Israelis had a lot of time to prepare.
This time it was just fast-flying ballistic missiles, as far as we know so far. It’s been described by senior U.S. defense officials as the largest attack on Israel in scale and scope: two waves roughly totaling 180 missiles. Almost all of them were either intercepted or landed in empty space. [National Security Advisor] Jake Sullivan has said the U.S. Navy helped intercept some of these, maybe twelve or so. The rest seem to have been intercepted by Israel’s layered air- and missile-defense system. And as far as we know the only casualty was one person killed in the West Bank.
So it looks like it was a massive attack that pretty much was neutralized. So it’s another embarrassment on top of a whole series of embarrassments for the Iranian regime.
Obviously as time goes on, more details will come out about exactly how they had indications and warning: Did they see the Iranians fueling up liquid-fueled missiles? Was that somehow part of what tipped them off? Or other intelligence? There’s still going to be a lot to learn.
TB: Is it fair to describe this as having achieved some penetration of Israeli air defenses? Were those systems overwhelmed in places?
EE: We don’t know exactly which systems were activated, which did the intercepts, etc. But all of these systems operate on an early warning system that is able to detect whether the incoming are headed toward populated areas or toward open water or unoccupied desert. And the system allows Israel to respond only to those that are headed toward populated areas. There were lots of reports as the strikes were going on of loud explosions being heard over Tel Aviv and Jerusalem and Haifa. So I think this is an indication of the system operating as designed.
Of course, you know, you can allow things to go into unpopulated areas when you’re talking about missiles with conventional warheads on them. But when you’re dealing with nuclear weapons, that would be a different kind of concern.
TB: Back in April, after Iran’s earlier attack, Israel’s response was relatively muted. What can we say at this point about what we should expect in terms of a response?
EE: The Israeli response in April was relatively muted in no small part because the United States impressed upon Israel that they did not want to see this conflict escalate into a larger regional war. President Biden spoke to Prime Minister Netanyahu and said, Take your victory. Don’t make this bigger than it needs to be. And the nature of the Israeli response was very clear—they could penetrate Iranian air defenses pretty much at will. The air defense radar that the Israelis took out on Iranian territory, it’s like a calling card: We were here, we can come back.
I think the context here is a lot different. In this instance, we have lots of press reports that the administration passed warnings to Iran through third parties before the fact—that if they responded to the Israeli neutralization of the Hezbollah leadership in Lebanon with a large attack, that the United States would probably not be able to restrain Israel. You then had Israeli statements saying that they would have a strong response if they were hit.
You’ve now had a lot of Israel supporters in the United States saying Israel has to retaliate at a very large scale. And the IDF spokesperson [R. Adm. Daniel] Hagari said that there will be very strong consequences for Iran. So I think we can expect a pretty serious Israeli response this time—probably not just a token single missile or raid.
TB: When we read about these conflicts, the word that always goes around is “escalation,” right? Iran has escalated, will Israel escalate? What would a proportional response look like in this case and what would escalation look like?
EE: In this instance, escalation is in the eye of the beholder. I don’t know exactly what Israel has in mind. I think you could see some targeting of Iranian energy infrastructure, for instance, to make it more difficult for them to export oil.
I think elements of the Iranian nuclear program could be a target this time. Theoretically, Hezbollah was meant to be a kind of deterrent to Israel attacking Iran’s nuclear program—at least they thought it was. Now it’s not clear that it will be a deterrent to Israel attacking the nuclear program.
I think they’re going to want to make Iran feel the pain.
Iranian leaders have said, if Israel retaliates, there will be another round and the Iranians will fire more missiles. There’s a real question in my mind about whether they really want to do that—they have been subject to serial humiliation here for a number of months now. And whether they want to buy another humiliation is an open question.