Trump’s Ukraine Deal Could Give Russia Everything It Wants
A frozen conflict in Ukraine is tantamount to a Russian victory.
PRESIDENT DONALD TRUMP and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky may be on the verge of signing an agreement that would see continued American aid for the embattled democracy in exchange for some kind of preferential access to the country’s mineral resources. While few of the deal’s details have been reported, any continuation of American support for Ukraine would be a good thing. But reports of the agreement give the impression that it is not designed to help Ukraine win—which, if true, would amount to a win for Russia. Having served in Europe for almost a third of my military career and having interacted with former Soviet bloc nations that were striving for democratic reform to counter and deter Russian aggression, I’m concerned that the proposed deal might contribute to yet another “frozen conflict,” which would be a victory for Russia and a threat to other allies and partners.
“Frozen conflicts” are military, ethnic, and territorial disputes left over from the collapse of the Soviet Union that Moscow has exploited to maintain influence and leverage at a time of relative weakness. They’re not exactly civil wars, because most of the time there’s little to no organized fighting, but they prevent states from controlling all of their territory and give Russian forces an excuse to hang out in areas Moscow considers its “near abroad,” or privileged sphere of influence—whether Russia’s neighbors like it or not. These conflicts often result in economic stagnation, hindered governance, and limited international recognition for breakaway regions, making them difficult to resolve through traditional diplomatic means. One of the critical factors that allowed Russia to create and exploit frozen conflicts was American distraction from Europe. At the height of the Cold War, the United States military presence in Europe exceeded 350,000 personnel. As a young officer, I was part of that force, patrolling the border and preparing to meet the Soviet hordes if they tried to break through the Fulda or Meiningen Gaps.
With the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, that all changed. With the threat of a Warsaw Pact invasion gone, the United States drastically scaled down its presence in Europe over the course of the 1990s. By the early 2000s, just 122,000 American troops remained in Europe—despite the American contributions to the NATO interventions in the Balkan Wars. By the 2010s, the number of soldiers in U.S. Army Europe had fallen to 30,000—enough for training and exercises with multinational partners, a supplement to potential NATO actions, and various contingency operations in Europe, Africa, and perhaps even the Middle East. These forces were an “ocean closer” to many trouble spots, but most of the soldiers stationed in Europe were in logistical and combat support units—not the kind of combat forces that had once faced down the Red Army. This was not an accident but the result of a multi-decade, bipartisan strategy. “In Europe, we seek lighter and more deployable ground capabilities and strengthened Special Operations Forces—both positioned to deploy more rapidly to other regions as necessary—and advanced training facilities,” Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld told Congress in 2004. By April 2013, the last U.S. main battle tanks left Europe following the inactivation of the two final Germany-based armored brigades.
Few outside a small community of Russia watchers, intelligence analysts, and Europe-focused soldiers like me noticed that as the United States was withdrawing, Russia was trying to claw back its former empire.
Since the end of the Cold War, the Russian military has not been anywhere near as strong as the American military, as exemplified by its inability to defeat even Ukraine. But the key to the strategy of frozen conflicts is that Russia wins by not losing. And that could happen again in Ukraine if the United States allows the conflict to drag on.
AS COMMANDER OF U.S. ARMY EUROPE, I monitored five frozen conflicts every day. Normally, there were not major developments. But they always threatened to boil over.
Transnistria: In the early 1990s, as Moldova sought independence from the Soviet Union, the Transnistrian region, with a significant Russian-speaking population, seceded from Moldova. Russia intervened militarily in 1992, supporting Transnistrian separatists against Moldovan forces. Following a ceasefire, Russia stationed “peacekeeping” troops in Transnistria, effectively limiting Moldova's Western aspirations. This ongoing Russian presence has hindered Moldova’s efforts to fully control its territory and pursue closer ties with the European Union and NATO. In my view, had Russia been successful in taking Odessa in Ukraine, they would have continued a linkup operation with their forces in Moldova, further threatening both Moldova and Ukraine.
Abkhazia and South Ossetia: Irredentists in both these regions sought independence from Georgia in the early 1990s, leading to the Georgian Civil War. Russia provided military support to the separatists and deployed peacekeeping forces. In 2008, tensions escalated into a full-scale war between Russia and Georgia, after which Moscow recognized both territories as independent states. Russia’s military presence and political backing have undermined Georgia’s sovereignty, obstructing its efforts to join Western institutions and regain control over these regions. (A Georgian battalion was part of my command in Iraq when Russia invaded Georgia in 2008. The unit returned to Tbilisi to fight their own war.) While the Abkhazia and South Ossetia conflicts remain frozen, Russian forces continually expand their lines little by little through a tactic known as “borderization.”
In 2011, when President Barack Obama announced a “rebalance to Asia,” I was in Tbilisi for an exercise with Georgian forces. I was promptly summoned by Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili to discuss the implications of the announcement. Analysts later suggested that the announcement may have inadvertently signaled a lack of U.S. concern for Eastern European security and may have emboldened later aggressive actions by Russia in Georgia and Ukraine.
Nagorno-Karabakh: While Armenia and Azerbaijan had engaged in a brutal war over this territory from 1988 to 1994, this predominantly ethnic Armenian enclave within Azerbaijan became a flashpoint for conflict when the Soviet Union dissolved. While Russia did not overtly instigate this conflict, it has maintained significant influence by supplying arms to both sides and positioning itself as a mediator. Since 2020, Azerbaijan has used its military superiority, its close relationship with Turkey, and Russia’s distraction in Ukraine to retake the region and force out the Armenian population. Russia’s de facto abandonment of Armenia amid repeated Azerbaijani offensives, and the resulting end of the frozen conflict, has weakened Russian influence in the Caucasus.
Crimea and Donbas: I retired from the Army in 2013, after spending a significant amount of time training Ukrainian army forces and engaging with their commanders. The Russian incursion into the largely Russian-speaking areas of Ukraine in 2014 was not unexpected. (“Russian-speaking,” of course, does not necessarily mean “ethnically Russian” or “desirous of being part of the Russian state” or “fond of Vladimir Putin” or “eager to be invaded, oppressed, robbed, and tortured.”) Following Ukraine’s Euromaidan protests and the midnight flight of their pro-Russian president, Russia annexed Crimea after a disputed referendum. Subsequently, pro-Russian separatists—supported by Russian soldiers and spies—declared independence, leading to ongoing conflict. Russia has provided military, economic, and political support to these separatists, destabilizing Ukraine, obstructing its efforts to integrate with Western institutions, and setting the stage for in the full-scale invasion of 2022.
Through each of these interventions, Russia effectively created and sustained frozen conflicts, leveraging them to exert control over neighboring countries and impede their Western integration efforts, while also using asymmetrical means to further divide NATO and the Western partnership. It didn’t matter that Russia didn’t control whole states or even the disputed regions—all that mattered was that they were opportunities to exploit. The breakaway regions existed somewhere outside international law, in the gray zone between peace and war, beyond any normal government, and most importantly, off American radar.
Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine has had profound implications that country, for the NATO alliance and its broader European security framework, and the future of Russian aggression on the continent. The negotiation this week between the United States and Ukraine may result in a new and larger frozen conflict that locks in Russian territorial gains, undermines Western credibility, and emboldens Moscow to pursue further aggressive actions in Europe.
Should Western support wane, Russia will likely consolidate its control over the four occupied Ukrainian territories—Crimea, Donetsk, Luhansk, and Zaporizhzhia—creating a protracted frozen conflict like those in Moldova, Georgia, the Caucasus. These conflicts serve Russia, allowing it to destabilize neighboring states, exert political leverage, and prevent integration into NATO and the European Union. A frozen conflict in Ukraine would prevent the country from achieving full sovereignty and reconstruction, leaving it as a permanent buffer zone between Russia and NATO. It would also tax the Ukrainian state and people and foment internal divisions. This would further deter European nations from deepening their security commitments, as they would be dealing with an unstable and indefinitely occupied Ukraine.
But perhaps the most dangerous consequence of bad negotiations or an insufficient Western response in Ukraine is the message it would send to Moscow. If we do not counter Russia’s desire for territorial expansion, Putin will be emboldened to pursue further actions against neighboring states: hybrid warfare in the Baltic region, renewed pressure on Georgia and Moldova, or even direct military threats against NATO’s eastern front.
The choices made by NATO, the United States, and Ukraine will have lasting consequences far beyond the current war. Insufficient support for Ukraine risks not only a frozen conflict that cements Russian territorial gains, but also the erosion of NATO’s credibility and European security cohesion. It could embolden Russia to undertake further aggression in Europe, testing the limits of NATO’s collective defense commitments. Any deal that allows Russia once again to avoid defeat would be a betrayal of the Ukrainians, a win for the Russians, and a blunder by the United States.
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